Most people know history at the level of myths or anecdotes. Very often, such folklore is created and constantly supported by the so-called “competent authorities”. One of these myths is the wildest fable about how Khrushchev “gave” Crimea to Ukraine. Historians know very well that Khrushchev simply could not give such a “gift”, even if he really wanted it. As of January 1954, Nikita Sergeevich was fifth in the Soviet table of ranks, after Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich and Bulganin.
But learned men are stubbornly silent and are not going to share their knowledge with the people. Moreover, this is strongly discouraged for them. However, living in an age high technology, it is not so difficult to obtain the necessary information that will make it possible to verify that Nikita Sergeevich is completely undeservedly enjoying the reputation of a sympathizer of Ukraine and the “donor” of Crimea. After Stalin's death, the fate of Crimea was of least interest to the state leaders. The country of the Soviets entered a five-year period of endless political battles, when careers were broken, destinies were crippled, when leaders of the highest rank had to show all their skills and miracles of resourcefulness. Thank God, unlike recent Stalinist times, removal from a high position no longer meant inevitable execution. This period of time, with its exciting political struggle, in the spirit of Shakespearean tragedies, is of little interest to today. But in vain!
Khrushchev is an attentive student of the leader.
The famous English historian Len Deighton, in the preface to his book, wrote amazing words that are worth quoting: “Misconceptions very often take root in history, and it is especially difficult to get rid of them when they become generally accepted and closed to revision. However, historical misconceptions are not limited to the British. Germans, Russians, Japanese and Americans also have their own myths and try to live in accordance with them, which often leads to tragic consequences.”
Almost everyone today has an idea about N.S. Khrushchev as the eccentric leader of the country he had become by 1964. Khrushchev was not always a tyrant gentleman who made extraordinary decisions. And in January 1954, when by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in an atmosphere of general jubilation, Crimea was solemnly “donated” to fraternal Ukraine as a symbol of eternal friendship between the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, Khrushchev was not the first person in the state. And he did not enjoy special authority in the highest party and government circles. Let's try to trace the unexpected rise of Nikita Sergeevich's career against the background of the chronology of the Crimean events. As Kozma Prutkov said: “Look at the root.” (It’s not the most fun thing to remember half-forgotten politicians who once desperately fought for the right to “rule” a huge state, but without remembering the affairs of the past, we will not be able to understand the whole meaning of the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine ).
Stalin and his entourage.
Let's remember who was on the political Olympus of the country of the Soviets in the last days of Stalin's life. This is Stalin himself, who held the posts of Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Secretary General. The most important post of Secretary General in the USSR was, strange as it may seem to hear, unofficial, not written down in any documents. The second person in the state and the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers was Malenkov. Khrushchev held a prominent, but not decisive, post as First Secretary of the Moscow Regional Committee of the Communist Party. Stalin, due to his age, sought to get away from the everyday routine that required large quantity time to work with documents. Therefore, the right to facsimile signature was delegated to Malenkov, Beria and Bulganin. Stalin seemed to give these confidants a little “steer.”
Panteleimon Kondratievich Ponomarenko.
The head of state was intensely looking for a successor. And I found it! If Stalin had died two weeks later, then Panteleimon Ponomarenko, who worked as the leader of Belarus from 1938 to 1948, would have become the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. And from 1948 to 1953 he was Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and a member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. And our whole history would perhaps have taken a completely different path. To approve a high-ranking party official in a new position, the corresponding document, according to the then rules, had to be signed by 25 members of the Presidium. There were 4 more signatures left. And then Stalin died.
Happy heirs. 10 months before the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine.
The happy heirs of the deceased leader began to divide portfolios. Malenkov became the Chairman of the Council of Ministers (the second person in the country automatically became the first). Beria became the first deputy and minister of internal affairs. Bulganin was appointed Minister of Defense. The veterans who had been relegated to a remote corner by Stalin returned to duty: Molotov and Kaganovich. Both became Malenkov's First Deputies. In addition, Molotov received control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Kaganovich control of several important ministries. P. Ponomarenko received the “consolatory” post of Minister of Culture. Khrushchev was instructed to focus on work in the Central Committee of the CPSU, which was to be governed collectively - the post of General Secretary was abolished. That is, Nikita Sergeevich’s prospects were very vague, his rivals were not going to let him take over the leadership of the state.
Georgy Maximilianovich Malenkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR from March 5, 1953 to February 8, 1955. It was precisely in the middle of his “term” that the “donation” of Crimea occurred.
Deadly games. 6 months before the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine.
Six months before the ceremonial transfer of Crimea to Ukraine, all the attention of Khrushchev and other applicants for power was occupied with problems that were more important to them. The people of the country of the Soviets perceived Malenkov as Stalin's successor. Meanwhile, the brutal war for power continued. Beria gained control over all punitive structures and his “comrades-in-arms,” who lived in an atmosphere of constant fear after the recent executions in the fabricated “Leningrad” case, considered that the time had come not to wait for possible reprisals, but to eliminate their potentially dangerous “colleague” themselves. Many sources point to Khrushchev as the initiator, who received the favorable support of the party and state elite of the USSR. On June 26, 1953, the unsuspecting Beria was arrested, and on December 23 he was shot.
Successful “operation” of Khrushchev. 3 months before the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine.
But the struggle for power continued. The rivals carefully monitored the “punctures” and mistakes of their colleagues. The decisive “mistake” in May 1953 was made by Malenkov. He halved the salaries of party officials, which caused great discontent among this privileged caste. This allowed Khrushchev, who had secured the support of the “offended”, to establish the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee, similar to the post of the General Secretary, in September. Nikita Sergeevich followed in the footsteps of Stalin, who gained absolute power in the country, being in the position of head of the party. Position is position, but the opponents are also very experienced, having gone through the Stalinist school. So the struggle was intense and without rules. There are 3 months left before the “donation” of Crimea.
Crimea was transferred to Ukraine. The behind-the-scenes fights are expanding and intensifying.
The cleansing of the theater of political struggle continued. In February 1954, Panteleimon Ponomarenko, a failed Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, was sent away from Moscow and became the head of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. A year later he found himself in Poland as an ambassador. In February 1955, Malenkov was removed from the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers and appointed to the post of Minister of Power Plants. Bulganin became Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. In May 1955, Kaganovich lost his position and was transferred to the State Committee for Labor and Wages. (Where he did probably the only good deed in his life - he introduced pensions for city residents. Before that, the vast majority of people survived in old age as best they could. O collective farmers, 8 years later, Khrushchev took care of). In June 1956, Molotov was removed from the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs. All these figures, including Khrushchev, clearly had no time for Crimea.
Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR from February 8, 1955 to March 27, 1958
February 1956. XX Congress of the CPSU. Desperate move by Khrushchev. 2 years since Crimea became Ukrainian.
At one time, highbrow Marxists, who quoted Marx almost by heart, underestimated the tongue-tied Caucasian with a primary education. And they paid for it with their lives. A similar situation arose with Khrushchev, whom his colleagues perceived as Stalin’s buffoon. The precarious balance that has developed in Communist Party By the time of the congress, Khrushchev had broken in his favor by using an unconventional move. His current competitors occupied leadership positions under Stalin and were involved in all Stalin's crimes. On the last day of the congress (so that opponents would not have the opportunity to respond), Khrushchev unexpectedly made an emotional denunciation of Stalin's crimes at a closed meeting. (However, we tried to ensure that this information was known to as many people as possible throughout the country). Although Stalin was blamed for everything, the main blow was dealt to the old Stalinist guard, primarily to Molotov, who was tipped for the post of First Secretary. Many wavering delegates, already accustomed to a prosperous and calm life, no longer wanted the turbulent Stalinist times and joined the supporters of Nikita Sergeevich.
Crimea has been Ukrainian for three and a half years. The struggle for power has reached its climax.
Khrushchev, in his rapid ascent to Olympus, pushed aside many highly respected people. In the end, they launched a powerful counterattack. On June 18, 1957, the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee decided to remove N.S. Khrushchev from the post of First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Khrushchev and his supporters managed to delay the resolution of the issue. The message about Khrushchev’s removal from the post of First Secretary, transmitted by Bulganin to the media and the State Committee on Radio and Television, was not published. Meanwhile, members of the Central Committee began to be urgently transported from all over the country by military planes. Khrushchev took timely measures and did not allow the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee to take power over the country. The meeting of the Presidium dragged on for several days and took on such acute forms that not everyone’s nerves could withstand it - L.I. Brezhnev, for example, lost consciousness and was carried out of the hall.
The “old guard” who lost the struggle for leadership and Shepilov who “joined them.”
On June 22, the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee opened and worked until June 29. The KGB clearly supported Khrushchev. Both sides desperately seduced the army, trying to attract it as a very powerful argument. The Minister of Defense, G.K. Zhukov, eventually took Khrushchev’s side, which finally broke the resistance of the “old party members.” Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Shepilov were expelled from the Central Committee. These events showed the great role of leadership Armed Forces. Marshal Zhukov allowed himself a number of careless statements that impressed Nikita Sergeevich, and Khrushchev considered it best, four months after the Plenum, to remove Zhukov from his position.
For four years Crimea has been part of Ukraine. Khrushchev received full power.
In March 1958, Bulganin and N.S. were dismissed. Khrushchev became Chairman of the Council of Ministers in addition to his title of First Secretary. Thus, he had as much power in his hands as Stalin had. Old enemies have been eliminated, but new ones are not yet visible. Now it was possible to grow corn, launch space rockets, give Crimea to Ukraine or Kamchatka to Belarus. But the Belarusians did not need Kamchatka, and Crimea had been part of Ukraine for the fifth year. How did it happen that in the process of the most acute political struggle, no one used the very fact of the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine as a strong trump card against the author of this idea? Because the initiator of the transfer of Crimea from one union republic to another died on March 5, 1953, and everyone else somehow didn’t care and, in general, had no time for it.
The famous corn or, as it was called in Pushkin’s time, “Beloyarov millet.” Ivan the Fool fed Beloyar millet to the mare who brought him the little humpbacked horse.
Who gave Stalin the idea to take Crimea from Russia and give it to Ukraine?
Of course, the leadership of the Russian Soviet Socialist Federal Republic. The letter to Stalin was signed by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR, Boris Nikolaevich Chernousov. It was not because of his good life that Chernousov turned to the leader. The work of his government was harshly criticized by Stalin, including for the environmental and economic disaster in Crimea. After the unusually vile eviction of the Crimean Tatars from their native land (first men were drafted into the army, and then women, old people and children were loaded onto a freight train), Crimea began to be populated by settlers from various areas Russia.
Boris Nikolaevich Chernousov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR from March 9, 1949 to October 20, 1952. He signed an appeal to Stalin with the idea of transferring Crimea to Ukraine.
These people were also not to be envied. For thousands of years, their ancestors adapted to life in humid and waterlogged areas, where water and dampness are enemy number one. And they were sent to an area with an extremely arid climate, where water is worth its weight in gold. Naturally, the environmental and economic catastrophe was not long in coming. And plus, in addition, in Crimea there was an immeasurable amount of excellent inexpensive wine - a difficult test for a Russian person. In general, the situation is dire and hopeless. And the leader demands a quick solution to the problems and does not want to put himself in anyone’s position.
The leadership of the RSFSR decided to take advantage of the next “Great Construction of Communism”, which began in September 1952. The creation of an energy complex in the lower reaches of the Dnieper began, including the construction of a power plant with a large reservoir and pumping station for pumping water through the designed canal. The main work on the construction of the Kakhovka hydroelectric complex, the South Ukrainian and North Crimean canals was carried out in Ukraine. The object was designated as the “Great Construction of Communism.” Stalin was given the idea that in order not to tear such an important object between the two republics, this would only complicate the work in organizational terms, it was proposed to transfer the Crimean region to the Ukrainian SSR. The Crimean region of the RSFSR was created in 1946 after the liquidation of the national republic of the Crimean Tatar people.
Postage stamp 1951 - "Great construction projects of communism."
To Stalin, the argumentation of the leadership of the RSFSR seemed quite reasonable and, despite attempts at resistance by the Ukrainian side, to which all responsibility for the problematic territory with a destroyed economy and alarming ecology was transferred, the transfer was authorized. The leader himself understood that under the conditions of the planned Soviet economy, the Crimean region of the RSFSR could receive some materials and resources only in the Russian Federation. And all this will have to be transported from Russia many kilometers away. Of course, something could have been taken from Ukraine. But to do this, one would have to go through complex bureaucratic slingshots and get it on a residual basis. There was a catastrophic shortage of materials and resources, and Ukraine was intensively restoring what was destroyed by the war. National economy. So, Crimea, a stranger to the leaders of Ukraine, could not count on serious injections. And the fate of Crimea was decided.
Already in 1952, work began on the design of the program, which had not yet been advertised. The gift of the “Russian people to the Ukrainian” was planned for January 1954 - it just arrived historical date, which was going to be widely celebrated at the state level: the so-called “Tercentenary of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia.” Such was the Soviet tradition - to coincide significant events with special dates.
After Stalin’s death, G.M. Malenkov became the main person in the USSR, who signed the transfer of the peninsula organized by Stalin, but the “glory” of the donor of Crimea to Ukraine went to Khrushchev. History gave Georgy Maximilianovich a very short period of time in power as the “first” person, and the people could not connect the “donation” of Crimea with his name.
I shared with you the information that I “dug up” and systematized. At the same time, he is not at all impoverished and is ready to share further, at least twice a week.
If you find errors or inaccuracies in the article, please let us know. My e-mail address: [email protected] . I will be very grateful.
Why did Khrushchev give up Crimea? Many people ask this question today. Due to the events last months Myths about the territorial affiliation of Crimea have resurfaced and swirled in the information space. The legend of Nikita Khrushchev’s “royal gift” is being especially actively discussed. They say that by his sole (and therefore illegitimate) decision he gave the peninsula to Ukraine. And since then, in the mighty cauldron of the USSR, the property of the fraternal republics was purely symbolic, the people remained silent - after all, everything was common, Soviet. For those who are interested in the historical truth, and not whose goal is the ideological justification for the entry of the autonomous republic into Russia, an analysis of the sources was carried out. Let's figure out why Khrushchev gave Crimea to Ukraine, whether he “gifted” it, and whether this “present” was pleasant.
Facts of redrawing lands of republican subordination in the USSR
Russian historians often call the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine an unprecedented act. They say that Khrushchev adored this region, and used the anniversary of the Pereyaslav Rada to ensure that his beloved country “grew into the land.” In fact, the act of transferring the peninsula from the RFSSR to the Ukrainian SSR did not have any ideological overtones. The decision was dictated by purely economic motives. And such a transfer was not the only one. Thus, in 1924, the Taganrog district of the Donetsk province was transferred to Russia. Later it became a district Rostov region. But the overwhelming majority of the population of this district, especially those living in rural areas, - ethnic Ukrainians. However, let's return to our peninsula. Why did Khrushchev give Crimea to Ukraine? After all, this is not just a piece of land, it is an all-Union health resort... But was it like that in 1954?
Myth 1: KHRUSHCHEV gave Crimea to Ukraine
In the 1990s, immediately after the collapse, conversations began on this topic. Some Russian politicians have raised the issue of Crimea. They found Khrushchev's son-in-law, Alexei Adzhubey, and ordered him, a professional journalist, to write an article based on personal memories of those events. He completed the order. But the article entitled “How and why Khrushchev gave Crimea to Ukraine. Memoirs on a given topic" was for political strategists. According to the journalist, in 1954, his father-in-law’s position on the Soviet throne was very shaky. He, of course, was the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, but in the country everything was still run by Stalin’s “hawks” - Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Bulganin. It would be very short-sighted on the part of Nikita Sergeevich to make serious decisions, and even ones that could lead to accusations of sympathy for national minorities to the detriment of the “great big brother”.
Myth 2: Khrushchev GIVEN Crimea to Ukraine
Let's try to reproduce the events of that time. Crimea, like other lands that were under fascist occupation, suffered greatly during the war. But the most terrible were the human losses. The population of the peninsula was halved, and in 1944 it was 780 thousand people. Instead of solving the problem with labor resources, the Soviet leadership began “ethnic cleansing.” Fifty thousand Germans who had lived on the peninsula since the time of Catherine II were evicted in the first days of the war. And after its end, their fate was repeated by 250 thousand Crimean Tatars, who were accused of “aiding the occupiers.” Ethnic Bulgarians, Greeks, Armenians and Czechs were also deported along with them. As a result of such incompetent policies, the economy of the peninsula completely fell. In order to raise it at least to the level of pre-war indicators, the government instructed the authorities of the Ukrainian SSR to provide the peninsula with water and energy resources. After all, there weren’t enough of them there.
Myth 3: Ukrainians came to everything ready-made
Soviet government decided to fill the depopulated region with Russian settlers, who were brought mainly from the northern regions. Many of them began to live in the houses of the deported Tatars and received “inheritance” of all their personal land. Only here are peasants from the Volga region and Arkhangelsk region grapevine, tobacco, essential oil crops were seen for the first time in my life. But potatoes and cabbage did not grow well in the arid Crimean climate. As a result of ten years of “management”, the economy of the peninsula has changed not in better side. Such a branch of agriculture as sheep breeding has completely disappeared. Vineyard crops were reduced by seventy percent, and orchard yields were even lower than wild trees. That’s why Khrushchev gave Crimea to Ukraine - collective farmers from the Ukrainian SSR were accustomed to growing southern vegetables and fruits, and climatic conditions The Kherson region and Odessa region were not much different from the steppes of the Dzhankoy or Simferopol regions.
Background
And yet, Nikita Sergeevich played some role in the fact that in 1954 a significant event took place - the annexation of Crimea to Ukraine. Khrushchev arrived on the peninsula six months earlier, driven by the idea of sowing the lands of the Soviet Union with corn. He was accompanied by his son-in-law, Alexey Adzhubey. He recalls: “Nikita Sergeevich was surrounded by a crowd of collective farmers. Since the meeting was truly business and not for the record, the conversation was open. The peasants complained that potatoes did not grow here, cabbage withered, and the conditions were unbearable. “We were deceived,” was heard more and more often from the crowd. That same evening, Khrushchev left for Kyiv. At a meeting in the Mariinsky Palace, he convinced the Ukrainian leadership to help the suffering population of the peninsula. “They need southerners there who love gardens, corn, and not potatoes,” he said.”
Myth 4: Illegitimate “gift”
Some unscrupulous historians claim that the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine by Khrushchev was a simple gift on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the Pereyaslav Rada. Therefore, such an act of alienation of the peninsula from Russian lands is illegitimate. Consequently, the current annexation of Crimea to Russia is the restoration of historical justice. But is it? Let's follow the events. In September 1953, the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee met. The main topic is the state of agriculture. The head of the Presidium of the Central Committee and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers at that time was G. M. Malenkov. It was at this meeting that the decision was made to transfer the peninsula to the Ukrainian SSR, since the economy of Crimea was already sufficiently integrated into the Ukrainian one. A month and a half later, at the end of October 1953, the Crimean Regional Committee responded to the decision of the Central Committee. He came up with a corresponding “initiative from below.” Throughout the winter of 1953-1954. intensive ideological work was carried out. Since nothing was done in the USSR without providing an ideological basis, it was decided to time the transfer of the peninsula from one fraternal republic to another to coincide with the anniversary of the reunification of the Ukrainian people with the Russian people. After the passage of the “Crimean issue” through all legal authorities in 1954, this came historical event. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR unanimously adopted a Decree on the transfer of the region from the Russian to the Ukrainian Union Republic. This decision was finally confirmed only in April 1954. Therefore, the statement that Khrushchev gave Crimea to Ukraine is superficial and historically incorrect.
Consequences of the transfer
Since the spring of 1954, immigrants from Ukraine - Kyiv, Chernigov and southern regions - began to come to the peninsula. The results have been visible for five years. A canal was built to drain water from the Dnieper. This irrigation system made it possible to bring Agriculture peninsula in good condition. The Ukrainian SSR built the world's longest trolleybus route, rebuilt Sevastopol, which was destroyed during the war, and boosted the economy of the steppe Crimea. Soviet newspapers of that time also recognized this - just look through the old files. Therefore, the question of why Khrushchev gave Crimea to Ukraine is purely political. History answers it a little differently than modern television.
Why Khrushchev gave Crimea to Ukraine and why there was almost no objection to him: excerpts from as yet unpublished archival records and printed memoirs of Dmitry Shepilov, one of the most striking and mysterious politicians of that era for today’s Russians.
Ukraine in 1954, I would like, firstly, to recall the evidence published 13 years ago of a direct participant in those events - Dmitry Shepilov, who between 1954 and 1957 was a rising star in Soviet politics. Foreign correspondents in Moscow even called him, albeit with exaggeration, “the third man in the Kremlin.”
The author uses this episode (I quote it with abbreviations) as an example of Nikita Khrushchev’s “managerial style”: “Being an extremely ambitious person, he wanted, after his transfer to work in Moscow, the Ukrainian people to see in him their generous “boss” and “patron” ". These feelings were dictated by a number of measures on the part of Khrushchev, which were clearly marked by ingratiation to the Ukrainian cadres and which, in some cases, contradicted the constitutional foundations of the Soviet state. The subsequent course of events showed Khrushchev’s deep delusion that in Ukraine he was a beloved father . (...)
One of the measures to “win” Ukraine to one’s side was Khrushchev’s solution to the issue of Crimea.
Celebrations dedicated to the 300th anniversary of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia were approaching. (...) In this regard, the anniversary sessions of the Supreme Soviets of the Ukrainian SSR and the RSFSR were celebrated. The Ukrainian Republic and the city of Kyiv were awarded the Order of Lenin. Kyiv Theater named after. Shevchenko showed in Bolshoi Theater their best operas and ballets. The stone for the future monument in honor of the reunification was laid at the Kievsky railway station in Moscow. Grandiose military parades and demonstrations took place in Moscow and Kyiv. In a word, everything necessary was done in the name of a noble goal - further strengthening the friendship of the two largest peoples and all other peoples of the Soviet country.
But Khrushchev wanted to present Ukraine with a gift on a golden platter, so that the entire republic would know about his generosity and constant concern for the success of Ukraine.
One of the numerous meetings on agriculture at that time was taking place in the Grand Kremlin Palace. At the presidium table were all members of the Presidium of the Central Committee and the Secretariat of the Central Committee. During the break, as usual, members of the Presidium and secretaries gathered in two rooms adjacent to the podium of the Presidium Great Hall(...) One and another urgent issues were discussed. Suddenly Khrushchev made a proposal: in connection with the celebration of the 300th anniversary, transfer the Crimean region from Russian Federation into the Ukrainian Republic.
“It’s a long way from Crimea to Russia,” he said. — Ukraine is closer. It will be easier to conduct all sorts of business affairs. I've already talked to someone about this. Ukrainians, of course, are salivating; they will be very happy if we give them Crimea. I think we will also come to an agreement with the Russian Federation. We just need to arrange all this wisely: so that the Supreme Councils of both republics ask the Union Supreme Council to make such a transfer. And Voroshilov needs to carry out all this kindly through the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. I think there will be no objections?
Of course, Khrushchev’s proposal was wrong, because it grossly violated and historical traditions, and Leninist national principles in party and state building. (...)
Since 1918, Crimea (Republic of Taurida, Autonomous Crimean Republic, Crimean Region) was part of the Russian Federation. Here, for decades, strong ties have been formed with planning, financial, cultural and other organizations of the Russian Federation.
But the main and decisive thing is the ethnic composition of the region. Of course, under the socialist system, in conditions of unbreakable friendship of peoples, resolving territorial issues does not present difficulties and cannot cause social conflicts. The territorial demarcation of the Central Asian republics took place amicably, Kazakhstan amicably transferred part of its territory to Uzbekistan, etc.
But when implementing any such measure, the party and government always took into account the totality of all circumstances in order to prevent the rights of any nation, national group or nationality, especially small ones, from being infringed. It is known that, in accordance with the principles Soviet Constitution even areas with a small population but special national composition population are allocated to autonomous national districts. (...)
When Khrushchev introduced his draft on the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine, the population of the Crimean region numbered 1 million 200 thousand people, of which 71.4 percent were Russians, 22.2 percent were Ukrainians, and 6.4 percent were other nationalities. And yet, when Khrushchev asked his question: “I think there will be no objections?” - N. Bulganin, A. Mikoyan, A. Kirichenko, L. Kaganovich and others responded with exclamations: “That’s right! Accept! Pass on!” And only V. Molotov, standing at the door to the next room, waiting for some kind of telephone conversation, said, without addressing anyone:
- Of course, such a proposal is incorrect. But, apparently, we will have to accept it.
This is how the Decree of February 19, 1954 was born on the transfer of the Crimean region from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR. The inconsistency of the motives for such a transfer set out in the Decree: common economics, territorial proximity, the presence of economic and cultural ties - was obvious to everyone. And yet the Decree appeared. And in Crimea they began to remake signs on Ukrainian language, introduce radio broadcasting, newspapers in Ukrainian, etc.
(...) But the fact is that this was one of the first acts of Khrushchev’s subjectivist, arbitrary approach to resolving state issues.
Khrushchev wanted to give Ukraine a gift in connection with the anniversary and thereby put another weight on the scale of his, as it seemed to him, glory in Ukraine. This was a clear and gross violation of the principles of national policy of the party and state. And, of course, not only V. Molotov, who submitted his remark, but also others (Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, Georgian, etc. communists) understood the fundamental incorrectness and inexpediency of such an act from all points of view.
Dmitry Kosyrev, political commentator at MIA Rossiya Segodnya
Most often, the thesis about Nikita Khrushchev’s “royal gift” comes up. They say that by his sole, and therefore illegitimate, decision, he gave the peninsula to Ukraine. True, in the USSR territorial property was a rather conventional concept: everything was common, Soviet.
However, we will still try to understand the true reasons why and how Crimea came under the jurisdiction of Ukraine. Russian historians often interpret this fact approximately as follows: Khrushchev adored this region, and used the anniversary of the Pereyaslav Rada to ensure that his beloved country “grew into the land.” In fact, the act of transferring the peninsula from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR did not have any ideological overtones. The decision was dictated by purely economic motives.
Transfer of lands from one subordination to another, in Soviet history have already happened. So, in 1924, the Taganrog district of the Donetsk province was transferred to Russia. Later, it became a district of the Rostov region. But, after all, the overwhelming majority of the population of this district, especially those living in rural areas, are ethnic Ukrainians.
However, let's return to our peninsula. So, why is it believed that Khrushchev himself gave Crimea to Ukraine in 1954? Actually, it was then that he “himself” had not yet decided anything: his son-in-law, the once famous journalist Alexey Adzhubey, told about this. He claims that in 1954, his father-in-law’s position on the Soviet “throne” was still very shaky.
Khrushchev, of course, was the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, but in the country everything was still ruled by Stalin’s “hawks” - Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Bulganin. And he simply would not have been allowed to make serious decisions, and even ones that could lead to accusations of sympathy for national minorities to the detriment of the “great big brother.”
Let's try to reproduce the events of that time. Crimea, like other lands that were under fascist occupation, suffered greatly during the war. But the most terrible were the human losses. The population of the peninsula was halved, and in 1944 it was 780 thousand people. Instead of solving the labor problem, the Soviet leadership began “ethnic cleansing.”
Fifty thousand Germans who had lived on the peninsula since the time of Catherine II were evicted in the first days of the war. And after its end, their fate was repeated by 250 thousand Crimean Tatars, who were accused of “aiding the occupiers.” Along with them, ethnic Bulgarians, Greeks, Armenians and Czechs were also deported. As a result of such incompetent policies, the economy of the peninsula completely fell. In order to raise it, at least to the level of pre-war indicators, the government instructed the authorities of the Ukrainian SSR to provide the peninsula with water and energy resources. After all, there weren’t enough of them there.
How did you try to get out of this situation? The Soviet government decided to “fill” the depopulated region with Russian settlers, who were brought mainly from the northern regions. Many of them began to live in the houses of the deported Tatars and received “inheritance” of all their personal land. Only, here, peasants from the Volga region and Arkhangelsk region saw grapevines, tobacco, and essential oil crops for the first time in their lives. But potatoes and cabbage did not grow well in the arid Crimean climate.
As a result of ten years of “management”, the economy of the peninsula fell into complete decline. Such a branch of agriculture as sheep breeding has completely disappeared. Vineyard crops were reduced by seventy percent, and garden yields were even lower than those of wild trees.
That is why, it was the economic reason that lay, first of all, at the basis of the decision to transfer Crimea to Ukraine: collective farmers from the Ukrainian SSR were accustomed to growing southern vegetables and fruits, and the climatic conditions of the Kherson region and Odessa region differed little from the steppes of the Dzhankoy or Simferopol regions.
Of course, it couldn’t have happened completely without Khrushchev here. In the second half of 1953, having already become the First Secretary of the Central Committee, Khrushchev came to Crimea. He was accompanied by his son-in-law, Alexey Adzhubey. who recalled: “Nikita Sergeevich was surrounded by a crowd of collective farmers. Since the meeting was, indeed, a business one, and not for the record, the conversation was open. The peasants complained that potatoes did not grow here, cabbage withered, and the conditions were unbearable. “We were deceived,” was heard more and more often from the crowd.”
That same evening, Khrushchev left for Kyiv. At a meeting in the Mariinsky Palace, he convinced the Ukrainian leadership to help the suffering population of the peninsula. “They need southerners there who love gardens, corn, and not potatoes,” he said.”
Many Russian historians argue that the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine was a simple “gift” on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the Pereyaslav Rada. And, therefore, such an act of alienation of the peninsula from Russian lands is illegitimate. Consequently, the current annexation of Crimea to Russia is the “restoration of historical justice.”
What was it really like? In September 1953, the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee met. The main topic is the state of agriculture. The head of the Presidium of the Central Committee and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers at that time was G. M. Malenkov. It was at this meeting that the decision was made to transfer the peninsula to the Ukrainian SSR, since the economy of Crimea was already sufficiently integrated into the Ukrainian one.
A month and a half later, at the end of October 1953, the Crimean Regional Committee responded to the decision of the Central Committee. He came up with a corresponding “initiative from below.” Throughout the winter of 1953-1954. intensive ideological work was carried out. Since nothing was done in the USSR without providing an ideological basis, it was decided to time the transfer of the peninsula from one fraternal republic to another to coincide with the 300th anniversary of the Pereyaslav Rada.
After the “Crimean issue” passed through all legal authorities, this historical event occurred on February 19, 1954. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR unanimously adopted a Decree on the transfer of the region from the Russian to the Ukrainian Union Republic. This decision was finally confirmed only in April 1954 at the Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
Since the spring of 1954, immigrants from Ukraine - Kyiv, Chernigov and southern regions - began to come to the peninsula. The results have been visible for five years. A canal was built to drain water from the Dnieper. This irrigation system brought the peninsula's agriculture into good condition. The Ukrainian SSR built the world's longest trolleybus route, rebuilt Sevastopol, which was destroyed during the war, and boosted the economy of the steppe Crimea. And Crimea became a highly developed region and was called the “all-Union health resort.”
Note ed. – in general, why was Crimea given to Ukraine? Yes, because, roughly speaking, they themselves “couldn’t cope with the economy, with the restoration after the war,” so they gave it away.And three years ago, they suddenly realized and decided to take away
On February 19, 1954, a decree was adopted on the transfer of the Crimean region to the Ukrainian SSR. Nikita Khrushchev with a sweeping gesture handed over Crimea to Ukraine.
"Credit history"
One of the versions of the transfer of Crimea is a “credit history” connecting the RSFSR and the American Jewish organization “Joint”. The idea of relocating Jews to Crimea began to be discussed immediately after the end of the Civil War. Foreign foundations actively lobbied for the issue. The Politburo repeatedly discussed this project. Its active supporters were Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Bukharin, Rykov. A branch of Agro-Joint Bank was created in Simferopol. In January 1924, there was already talk of an “autonomous Jewish government, federated with Russia,” and a draft decree was prepared on the creation of a Jewish Autonomous SSR in the northern part of Crimea. The Jewish Telegraphic Agency (ETA) distributed a corresponding message abroad on February 20, 1924. In 1929, an agreement was concluded between the RSFSR and the Joint organization. The document carried beautiful name“On Crimean California” contained the obligations of the parties. The Joint allocated $1.5 million per year to the USSR (until 1936, $20 million was received), and for this amount the Central Executive Committee pledged 375 thousand hectares of Crimean land. They were issued in shares, which were bought by more than 200 Americans, including politicians Roosevelt and Hoover, financiers Rockefeller and Marshall, General MacArthur. The decision to create “Crimean California” was delayed. During Tehran Conference Roosevelt reminded Stalin of his obligations, the Secretary General was in no hurry, but some historians explain the deportation of the Tatars in 1944 precisely by the liberation of Crimea for Jewish settlers. 1954 was the deadline for paying off debts and Khrushchev made a “knight’s move”, giving Crimea to Ukraine.
National question
One of the main “Crimean” issues is the national issue. In 1944, the deportation of peoples began from Crimea. Usually they only talk about the deportation of Tatars, but not only Tatars were evicted. Greeks (almost 15 thousand) and Bulgarians (12.5 thousand) were deported. The Tatars left most of all for Uzbekistan. Greeks and Bulgarians were settled in Central Asia, Kazakhstan and certain regions of the RSFSR. According to the 1939 census, about 50% of Russians, 25% of Tatars and only 10.2% of Ukrainians lived in Crimea. After the deportation of the Tatars in 1944, Crimea “howled.” Agriculture suffered especially heavy damage. In 1950, compared to 1940, grain production fell by almost five times, tobacco production by three times, and vegetables by half. In 1953, there were 29 grocery stores and 11 department stores throughout the region. In the 60s, the process of returning the Tatars and settling Crimea with Ukrainians and Russians began. Voluntary-forced Ukrainization was underway. Everywhere except Sevastopol, the Ukrainian language was introduced into the school curriculum. Today there are more than 2 million people in Crimea. 1 million are Russians, more than 400 thousand are Ukrainians, and 240 thousand are Tatars. It is not surprising that the words of the Ukrainian president “One country, one people, one religion” are perceived in Crimea at least ambiguously.
Historical background
The transfer of Crimea to Ukraine is an idea that was in the air ten years before 1954. Even at the height of the Great Patriotic War, when the Germans were driven out of the peninsula, Khrushchev, who was then the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, ordered a certificate to be drawn up on Crimea. Khrushchev searched the archives for historical connections between Russia and Ukraine. One of the staff members recalled that Nikita Sergeevich told him about 1944: “I was in Moscow and said: “Ukraine is in ruins, and everyone is pulling out of it. What if we give her Crimea?“ After that, they didn’t call me that and they didn’t shake my soul. They were ready to be crushed into dust.”
The question of legitimacy
The issue of the legitimacy of the transfer of Crimea is still controversial. The main noise arises when the question of a referendum arises. Allegedly, a nationwide referendum was to be held in the country, but the rights and legal framework for the referendum were not described in the Soviet Constitution, except for the mention in Article 33 that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR could hold it. Important: I could, but I don’t have to. Thus, the question of a referendum is removed. The answer to the question about the body that has the authority to give or not give consent to change borders is given to us by Article 22 of the Constitution: “The highest body state power The RSFSR is the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR." According to Article 24, “The Supreme Council of the RSFSR is the only legislative body of the RSFSR.” Article 151 states that the Constitution can only be amended by a decision of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, adopted by a majority of “at least two-thirds of the votes.” Thus, the amendment to Article 14 of the Constitution of the RSFSR and the removal of the Crimean region from it can be regarded as consent received for the transfer of this region to another union republic. Thus, the legal procedure for transferring Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 was absolutely correct. The issue was discussed by the Presidiums of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation and the Ukrainian SSR, and they jointly appealed to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. And only on the basis of this appeal was a resolution adopted and a decree signed on the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine
Who made the decision?
It is believed that the decision to transfer Crimea was made by Khrushchev. In November 1953 he made a trip to Crimea. According to his son-in-law, journalist Alexei Adzhubey, who accompanied him, he was shocked that in the southern region there were no vegetables and fruits in state trade. A common misconception is that Khrushchev was Ukrainian and this influenced the decision to transfer Crimea. This is, of course, not true. Khrushchev was not a Ukrainian, he never spoke Ukrainian. Another thing is that he had a certain Ukrainian sentiment, as well as a feeling of guilt for participating in the repressions. This could have an indirect impact, but government decisions are not made at the level of sentiment, and Khrushchev was not the only one who made the decision on the transfer. The king is made by his retinue. Khrushchev's retinue included Bulganin, Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Kuusinen. The main role was played by Georgy Malenkov, who headed the Council of Ministers.
Black Sea Fleet
The issue with the Black Sea Fleet, based in Sevastopol, still remains problematic. According to Ukrainian laws, the presence of foreign military installations on its territory is prohibited, but for Russian fleet Ukraine is making an exception for now. In April 2010, Viktor Yanukovych agreed to extend Russia's lease of the naval base in Sevastopol, which expired in 2017, for another 25 years with the possibility of extension. During the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine, the issue of the fleet was not raised; Ukraine was union republic, legal problems arose already in 1991.
Question about returning
The first major Russian politician to talk about the return of Crimea was Vice President Alexander Rutskoy. Since that time, the issue of the return of Crimea to Russia has been raised many times. Several referendums held in Crimea have shown the population's loyalty to reunification with Russia. According to the results of the last official census, conducted in 2001, 10.1% of residents of Crimea named Ukrainian as their native language. 97% of the population are Russian-speaking. This issue has gained new relevance today, when Ukraine is going through hard times.
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