In the Far East, there is a redistribution of troops on the border with the DPRK

Officially, the movement of equipment is the transfer to the areas of control checks and back, but military experts do not rule out strengthening the borders.

Trains with military equipment moving through Khabarovsk towards Primorye have been noticing for several days locals. A video recording of the passage of one such train was at the disposal of the editors of the IA PrimaMedia. Officially, the press service of the Eastern Military District calls the movement of equipment a transfer to the areas of control checks after the winter period of training and back. Meanwhile, retired military and experts are seriously discussing a possible increase in the presence of the army on the border with the DPRK in connection with a possible Korean-American conflict, AmurMedia reports.

According to the author of the video, in just one Easter day (April 16), this was the third composition that he observes. With the question of where this technique is moving in such quantities corr. IA PrimaMedia turned to the head of the press service of the Eastern Military District Alexander Gordeev.

I can’t say specifically for each composition, but today the equipment is basically moving around the regions, in connection with the scheduled control checks based on the results of the winter training period. Military units go to unfamiliar training grounds and work out tasks in a new area. We recently completed such a check in the Trans-Baikal Territory. With a high probability, the composition returns the equipment to the point of permanent deployment, Gordeev said.

Two interviewed correspondents hold a different opinion. IA PrimaMedia military expert who wished not to disclose their names. Both of them, independently of each other, expressed the version that such a movement military equipment may be related to tensions in Korean-American relations.

This is a common practice, when neighbors fight, our country strengthens its borders. This has always been the case, and I think it is the same today. Although I must say that this is just my opinion. How it really is, I still don’t know for sure, - one of the experts emphasized.

Retired officer Stanislav Sinitsyn notes that pulling forces to the borders is a preventive necessity in this situation.

AT last week On the territory of the Primorsky Territory, there is a movement of military equipment by various types of delivery to the southern regions of the Territory. Many associate this with the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Judging by the footage, artillery systems are being transported, which either support and accompany the infantry in the offensive, or meet the aggressor with dense fire. Since the movement of other military units is not visible, it remains, most likely, as an option, to use these artillery systems to prevent massive external influence. In case of a land invasion, if the North Koreans run towards the border with Russia, the former soldier notes.

According to him, the repeated actions of the DPRK related to the launch of missiles and the declaration of the presence of nuclear weapons cannot remain without the closest attention of all nearby countries. Including Russia. Therefore, to be prepared for surprises of a military nature is one of the main tasks of the armed forces of any country.

Such transfers of troops, as a rule, take place strictly on the orders of the highest-level military leadership, so the movement of military equipment indicates that the leadership of our country is monitoring the situation and taking appropriate measures. Moreover, moving equipment can often be used on its own to a limited extent, so talking about “some kind of war” is not appropriate. This is a preventative necessity in this situation. The bitter experience of 1941 showed the degree of underestimation of advance preparation. In practice, in the event of an aggravation of the situation, all the more so initiated by the military component, the armed forces of all neighboring countries, of course, increase their vigilance, and our country is no exception. This is not the first time that the DPRK has disturbed the calm in the region, so this situation deserves attention, the source said.

August 9, 1945 Soviet troops launched an offensive simultaneously along the entire front with a length of more than 5 thousand km from Erlian on the southern border of Mongolia to Posyet Bay in Primorye. Together with them, the 80,000-strong army of the Mongolian People's Republic acted.

The troops of the Trans-Baikal Front had to overcome the wild, hard-to-reach mountains of the Greater Khingan Range, the approaches to which in the Qiqikar and Changchun directions were blocked by the powerful Manchu-Chzhalainor, Khailar and Khalun-Arshan fortified regions. Relying on them and defensive lines prepared in advance on mountain passes, the Japanese command hoped to detain the Red Army in the border area.

But Soviet troops, with the support of aviation, stormed the Manchu-Chzhalaynor and Khalun-Arshan regions, bypassed and blocked the Hailar fortifications. Without stopping to destroy the blocked pockets of resistance, they soon reached the western slopes of the Greater Khingan in the Qiqihar direction.

The troops of the front's main grouping crossed the Great Khingan and, advancing 250-400 km in five days, reached the deep rear of the main forces of the Kwantung Army on the Central Manchurian Plain.

Having overcome the Great Khingan, Soviet and Mongolian formations moved to the most important centers of Northeast China: Zhangjiakou (Kalgan), Chengde (Rehe), Mukden (Shenyang), Changchun, Qiqihar.

Simultaneously with the Trans-Baikal Front, the 1st Far Eastern Front launched an offensive from Primorye. Within a few days, his troops overcame the long-term and field fortifications of the enemy and, advancing in difficult terrain, reached the approaches to the Central Manchurian Plain.

Meanwhile, on the extreme left wing of the front, the advancing troops, together with the landing detachments of the sailors of the Pacific Fleet, captured the ports of Ungi (Yuki), Najin (Racin), Chongjin (Seishin) in North Korea, depriving the Japanese fleet of the bases it needed.

The troops of the 2nd Far Eastern Front, advancing from the north, also operated in a no less difficult situation. They had not only to break into strong fortifications, but also to force the high-water rivers Amur and Ussuri.

Already on August 9, the troops of the front, having launched an offensive, captured a number of bridgeheads on the Manchurian banks of these rivers. For two days there were fierce battles for the Fugdinsky defense center, located in the swampy floodplain of the river. Songhua.

After its capture, Soviet troops moved southwest to the exits to Central Manchuria. The 2nd Far Eastern Front was greatly assisted by the Amur river flotilla, which ensured the crossing of the Amur, made a heroic campaign along the river. Sungari from the border to Harbin.

The 2nd Red Banner Army, advancing from the Blagoveshchensk region, crossed the Amur, overcame the Lesser Khingan Range and reached the last strongholds that covered Qiqihar from the north and northeast.

The defeat of the Kwantung Army by the Soviet troops and the surrender of Japan (August 9-September 2, 1945).

On August 11, the troops of the 2nd Far Eastern Front began fighting for South Sakhalin. Using the features of the terrain, the enemy created here solid system long-term structures. The road to the south of the island was covered by the Koton fortified area, which was a complex engineering structure.

However, already on August 13, Soviet troops managed to capture its center - the city of Coton and create favorable conditions for further advance to the south.

Thus, during the first week of the offensive, the enemy's resistance was broken in all main directions. Soviet troops advanced hundreds of kilometers, dismembering the Kwantung Army into separate groups in the areas of Qiqihar, Harbin, Jilin (Jilin), Changchun, and Mukden.

The entry of the Soviet Union into the war deprived the Japanese militarists of their last chances for happy outcome war and put before them with all the urgency the question of unconditional surrender.

On the morning of August 9, the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War was hurriedly convened in Tokyo. The Minister of War, the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Main Naval Staff demanded four conditions: the preservation of the existing state system, the punishment of war criminals by the Japanese themselves, independent disarmament, and the prevention of the occupation of Japan by the Allies (in extreme cases, the occupation should be short and not affect the capitals).

Group statesmen led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, believed that only the first condition should be put forward.

The Supreme Council did not make an agreed decision. The meeting of the Council of Ministers turned out to be just as useless. And only on the night of August 10, at a secondary meeting of the Supreme Council for the leadership of the war in the presence of the emperor, it was decided to capitulate.

On August 10, the Japanese government handed over to the Allied Powers a declaration of acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. In this statement, in particular, it was said that "the Japanese government understands that this declaration does not contain requirements that infringe on the prerogatives of the emperor as the sovereign ruler of Japan."

In the response of the four Allied Powers to the Japanese Declaration, it was stated that from the moment of surrender, the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government would be subordinate to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, and the form of government would ultimately be established in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.

However, the military group actually continued to insist on their demands. Moreover, on August 10, the newspapers published an appeal by the Minister of War "To all generals, officers and soldiers of the army," which spoke of the need to "bring the holy war to an end."

The command of the armies outside of Japan spoke out resolutely in favor of continuing the war.

The supporters of the war were ready, through a conspiracy, to eliminate the leaders who demanded immediate surrender.

To overcome serious disagreements in the government, on August 14 at 10 am, the emperor convened a joint meeting of the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War and the Cabinet of Ministers.

Such a joint meeting had previously been held only once, on December 1, 1941, when the decision to start the war was made. Supporters of the war were forced to agree with the decision to surrender, formalized as the imperial will.

On August 14, the Japanese government informed the governments of the four powers that the Japanese emperor had issued a rescript on Japan's acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and was ready to give orders on his behalf to all the military, naval and air authorities of Japan and all armed forces under their control, wherever they were , stop fighting and surrender weapons, and give such other orders as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Armed Forces may require.

Japanese troops capitulated to the armies of the United States, England and Kuomintang China. Only individual groups of the Kwantung Army continued to resist the Red Army until August 19.

In view of this, the Soviet command issued an explanation in which it stated that since "there is no real surrender of the armed forces of Japan yet", the Soviet troops will "continue their offensive operations against Japan."

True to its tactics of provocation and treachery, the Japanese command in every possible way delayed the surrender, continuing to resist. Soviet troops in Manchuria and Korea, in South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. Much more effort had to be expended to force the Kwantung Army to lay down its arms.

The offensive of the Red Army took place in conditions when the rear fell behind and an acute shortage of fuel and ammunition began to be felt. Nevertheless, it continued non-stop both in Manchuria and South Sakhalin.

On August 19, Soviet troops captured Chengde and reached the Liaodong Gulf, completely isolating the Kwantung Army from other Japanese troops in China.

The next day, units of the Red Army entered Harbin, Kirin, Changchun and Mukden, where airborne assault forces had been landed the day before. On August 21, an amphibious assault landed in the North Korean port of Wonsan (Genzan), and the city's garrison capitulated.

Strong blows were required in order to drive the Japanese invaders from the fortified Kuril Islands. The northernmost islands of the Kuril chain, Syumsyu and Paramushir, where naval bases were located, were especially fortified.

Early in the morning of August 17, Soviet landing craft and warships withdrew from the coast of Kamchatka and headed for the island of Syumsu. There was a thick fog in the sea, under the cover of which ships on August 18 secretly approached the island and began to land.

When the landing advanced into the interior of the island, the Japanese discovered it and opened fire. Fierce fighting continued until August 22, when the enemy laid down their arms.

The occupation of the remaining islands did not cause much difficulty. On August 22, airborne assault forces landed in Far (Dalian) and Port Arthur (Luishun), and a day later tank and infantry troops entered there.

The strikes of the Soviet ground forces, the bold actions of air and sea landings completely disorganized the Kwantung Army and broke its resistance.

On August 19, its command announced its readiness to capitulate to the Soviet troops. Japanese soldiers and officers began to surrender. Only in separate places resistance continued until early September.

On August 23, Moscow honored the valiant Soviet troops, sailors of the Pacific Fleet and fighters of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army with a solemn salute, who defeated the Japanese aggressors in a short time.

During fierce fighting, the enemy lost 83,737 people killed. 594 thousand Japanese soldiers and officers were taken prisoner. Large trophies were captured.

Only the troops of the Trans-Baikal and 1st Far Eastern Fronts took 1565 guns, 600 tanks, 861 aircraft, as well as many other weapons and military equipment. The troops of the 2nd Far Eastern Front and the Red Banner Amur Flotilla captured all the ships of the Sungarian military river flotilla.

The defeat of the Kwantung Army, carried out in fact within 10 days, was a vivid manifestation of the combat power of the Soviet Armed Forces, an indicator of the further growth of Soviet military art.

As well as in battles against Nazi German invaders, Soviet soldiers showed examples of high military skill, valor and heroism in operations in the Far East.

Lieutenant-General Shimizu Noritsune, commander of the Japanese 5th Army who surrendered, said: “We did not think that the Russian army would pass through the difficult areas of the taiga. Such a lightning offensive by the Russians was unexpected for us.”

The Japanese generals considered the direction leading to Manchuria through the Great Khingan inaccessible for the actions of large military masses, especially for tank formations.

The combat successes of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East were highly appreciated. A number of formations and units of the fronts that distinguished themselves in battles with the Japanese troops received the honorary names Khingan, Amur, Sakhalin, Ussuri, Harbin, Mukden, Kuril, Port Arthur. Many units, formations and ships were awarded orders of the Soviet Union.

In battles with the Japanese militarists, the guards of the Pacific Fleet were born. For the exemplary performance of the combat missions of the command, six Heroes of the Soviet Union were awarded the second Gold Star medal, and 85 people received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

A large number of generals, officers, sergeants, soldiers and sailors were awarded orders and medals of the USSR. In memory of the victory, the medal "For the Victory over Japan" was established, which was awarded to participants in this war.

Together with the Red Army, the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army fought heroically. Her role was highly appreciated by the government and peoples of the Soviet Union.

In the order dated August 23, 1945, on the occasion of the final victory over Japan, along with the distinguished troops of the heroic Red Army, units of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army were also mentioned.

By a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of October 8, 1945, a group of Mongolian generals and officers who showed courage and heroism in battles with the Japanese imperialists were awarded orders of the USSR. About 2 thousand people were awarded military orders and medals of the Mongolian People's Republic.

The Far Eastern grouping of Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War consisted of the Ground Forces, the Air Force, the Navy and the Air Defense Forces of the country's territory. Organizationally, they were part of the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal fronts. Pacific Fleet, Red Banner Amur Flotilla. Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal air defense zones of the country. Land and sea borders were guarded by border troops.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, taking into account the real danger of aggression from imperialist Japan, during almost the entire war was forced to keep in the Far East from 32 to 59 calculated divisions of the ground forces, from 10 to 29 aviation divisions and up to 6 divisions and 4 brigades of the Air Defense Forces of the country's territory with a total number of over 1 million soldiers and officers, 8 - 16 thousand guns and mortars, over 2 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, from 3 to 4 thousand combat aircraft and more than 100 warships of the main classes. In total, this amounted to 15 to 30 percent of the combat forces and means of all Soviet Armed Forces in different periods of the war (475) . Combat and strength of the Far Eastern grouping in 1941 - 1945. shown in tables 5 and 7.

Table 6. The combat composition of the Soviet troops in the Far East in 1941 - 1945 (476)

Associations, connections and separate parts

Availability on

rifle

cavalry

tank

aviation

rifle

tank

aviation

Fortified areas

Personnel

Guns and mortars

Tanks and self-propelled guns

combat aircraft

warships

In the summer-autumn campaign of 1941, from the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal fronts, the Stavka used Soviet-German front 12 rifle, 5 tank and motorized divisions - a total of over 122 thousand people, more than 2 thousand guns and mortars, 2209 light tanks, over 12 thousand vehicles, 1500 tractors and tractors.

The Japanese high command closely followed the course of hostilities on the Soviet-German front and the grouping of Soviet troops in the Far East, trying to determine the most favorable moment for an attack on the USSR. This is evidenced by a document sent to the troops in the early days of December 1941, when the German fascists stood at the walls of Moscow: “To complete the continuous preparations for operations against the Soviet Union, not only the Kwantung Army, but also every army and first-line formations must make every effort efforts to ensure that, observing the gradually occurring changes in the military situation of the Soviet Union and Mongolia, to be able at any moment to establish the true situation. This applies especially to the present conditions, when it becomes more and more necessary to quickly establish the signs of a turning point in the situation” (481).

Considering the threat of attack, the Headquarters used the Far Eastern forces and means on the Soviet-German front only in the most minimal quantities. From December 5, 1941 to April 30, 1942, only two rifle divisions were transferred there from the Trans-Baikal Front, and a cavalry regiment from the Far East.

In the summer and autumn of 1942, when the Wehrmacht fiercely rushed to the Volga and the Caucasus, the Japanese command again prepared to strike at the Soviet Far Eastern border. It was during that period that the military operations of its armed forces did not differ in activity for any pacific ocean, nor in China. Meanwhile, the offensive of the Nazi troops required new reserves. From May 1 to November 19, the Headquarters transferred 10 rifle divisions from the Far East to the Stalingrad and Southwestern Fronts, to the Bryansk Front - 4 rifle brigades with a total strength of about 150 thousand people, over 1600 guns and mortars, a large number of other weapons and combat technology.

In the winter of 1942/43, only 1 rifle and 3 cavalry divisions, 6 howitzer artillery brigades and 3 mortar regiments with a total number of about 35 thousand people, 557 guns and mortars, 32 light tanks and other weapons were transferred from the Far East to the Stavka reserve. In 1943, only 8 howitzer artillery brigades, formed in March - May, with a total number of about 9 thousand people, more than 230 large-caliber field guns, were transferred from the Far East to the Soviet-German front.

The last regrouping of Soviet troops from the Far East was carried out during the summer-autumn campaign of 1944. These were an airborne brigade and four high-capacity howitzer artillery regiments.

During the war years, 39 divisions, 21 brigades and 10 regiments were redeployed to the Headquarters reserve from the ground forces of this group. Their total number was about 402 thousand people, over 5 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3300 tanks (482).

An important role in the defeat of Nazi Germany belongs to the sailors of the Pacific Fleet and the Red Banner Amur Flotilla. In 1941, 12 naval rifle brigades were formed from their composition. More than 140,000 Pacific sailors fought in the ground forces on the Soviet-German front (483). In 1941 - 1944 the active Northern and Black Sea fleets were replenished with warships, as well as well-trained sailors and pilots of the Pacific Fleet (484).

Thus, the Soviet Supreme High Command, constantly taking care of strengthening the borders in the Far East, practically during the first three years of the war used the Far Eastern grouping as one of the sources of replenishment of the troops operating against Nazi Germany, creating new units and formations.

During the war years, the transfer of combat forces and means, weapons and military equipment from one theater of operations to another clearly testifies to the great contribution of the Far Eastern troops to achieving victory over Nazi Germany. The main part of these forces and means was sent by the Headquarters to the Soviet-German front in the most difficult and crucial moments of the war against Germany.

In the second half of 1943, when a radical change took place on the Soviet-German front in favor of the Soviet Union, and Italy fell out of the fascist bloc, it became clear to the whole world that sooner or later Germany and Japan would fall after her. The successes of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces changed the course of the entire Second World War and enabled the United States and Great Britain to intensify operations in the Pacific.

Since that time, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command almost did not attract the combat forces and means of the Far Eastern grouping to the Soviet-German front and began to carry out measures for its development. In August 1943, the Primorsky Group of Forces was formed as part of the Far Eastern Front (1st and 25th combined arms armies, all formations and units located in Primorye, as well as the 9th Air Army, operationally subordinate to it).

Gradually, the combat and numerical strength of the Far Eastern group increased, the troops were saturated with automatic and conventional small arms. Artillery, tank and aircraft fleets were replenished with new types of guns and vehicles, their logistics improved.

In 1944, 11 rifle divisions, a mechanized corps headquarters, a mechanized brigade, several mechanically driven artillery regiments, and a field-type fortified area (485) were deployed. In February 1945, the General Staff, the central and main departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense were intensively working to prepare plans for the deployment of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East, as well as to concentrate the necessary amount of material and technical means there (486) .

Calculations have shown that military-political goals can be achieved in a short time only if there are three powerful offensive groupings in the Far Eastern theater of operations and a significant superiority over the enemy in manpower and equipment. To do this, it was necessary to sharply increase the combat and numerical strength of the Far Eastern formations.

The strategic deployment of troops in the Far East differed from the preparation of offensive operations in Europe in that it was carried out in advance and had two stages (initial and final), each of which solved different tasks.

The initial stage, completed in the main in the autumn of 1941, was carried out in order to reliably secure the state border from possible Japanese aggression. On the territory of the two former border military districts, deployed in fronts, only covering troops were concentrated, but also forces and means capable of delivering an immediate retaliatory strike. Throughout the war with fascist Germany, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command systematically improved the defensive power of the Far Eastern group, almost doubling the number of its personnel.

The final stage of the strategic deployment, in which both the troops stationed in this theater and those concentrated as a result of the regrouping, took part during the immediate preparation of the offensive campaign against Japan. Its goal was to create a new strategic front of armed struggle in a new theater of operations. Such important problems as ensuring the secrecy of the regrouping and concentration of troops in the corresponding strategic directions, covering their deployment, command and control of troops, and their comprehensive material and technical support were solved.

At the end of February - March 1945, the General Staff approved plans for the deployment of troops in the Far East and their logistics (487) . March 14th State Committee Defense decided to strengthen the air defense of the Far East and Transbaikalia (488) . By a directive of March 19, the Stavka detached from the Far Eastern Front and subjugated the Primorsky Group of Forces, creating a third strategic direction for the deployment of troops (489). On March 26, the Supreme Command Headquarters assigned new tasks to the Far Eastern Front and the Primorsky Group of Forces to cover the deployment of troops (490).

Considering the important role of the armored forces in the upcoming campaign, in March 1945, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command began to upgrade the equipment of the tank formations of the Far East, which were armed only with obsolete T-26 and BT light slippers throughout the war. In all tank brigades, the first battalions were armed with T-34 tanks. The first tank regiments of the 61st and 111th tank divisions were transferred to the same armament. In total, it was planned to send 670 T-34 tanks (491) to the Far East. At the same time, a list of measures for the medical support of the Far Eastern campaign was approved. It was necessary to transfer 348 different medical units and institutions, create a reserve of personnel, supplies of materials and funds for medical care (492).

In view of the fact that the main part of the troops and cargo was planned to be transported by rail, Supreme Commander-in-Chief I. V. Stalin instructed the People's Commissariat of Railways to prepare the Eastern and Far Eastern railways for mass transportation. In February 1945, a check was made of the mobilization readiness of a number of highways of the Far East to ensure a wide flow of military traffic, and measures were outlined to increase their throughput (493) .

At the beginning of 1945, the operational and technical condition of the eastern railways did not fully meet the requirements of the situation. There were many rotten sleepers on the Trans-Siberian Railway, more than 11 thousand pieces of worn or burst rails, which significantly limited the throughput of many sections. The subgrade on some lines needed to be strengthened, especially in the section passing along the shore of Lake Baikal, where even before the war, work on the device had been started, but not completed. retaining walls and repair of emergency tunnels (494) . Meanwhile, in the difficult days of the war, all stocks of rails, sleepers, turnouts, a significant part of the locomotive fleet were sent to the western roads.

There was also a shortage of skilled workers who were mobilized into the military operational departments and special formations of the People's Commissariat of Commissariat for Service to service the western roads. In spite of Taken measures upon the return of specialists, by the beginning of hostilities against militaristic Japan, about 20 thousand of them were missing on the railway lines of the Far East (495) .

In the spring of 1945, the capacity of the Tomsk and Omsk railways and some lines of the Far East was increased. On April 13, the State Defense Committee adopted a resolution "On measures to improve the operation of the railways of the Far East (Krasnoyarsk, East Siberian, Trans-Baikal, Amur, Far Eastern and Primorskaya)". In order to improve the management of the activities of these highways, the Special District of the Far East Railways was created, headed by the Deputy People's Commissar of Railways V. A. Garnyk. General A.V. Dobryakov became the authorized representative of the Central Directorate of Military Communications of the BOSO under the district.

For some sections, it was necessary to increase the capacity from 12 to 38 pairs of trains. The People's Commissariat of Railways was charged with increasing the number of locomotives on the railways of the Far East: by May 1, 1945 - up to 2708, by July 1 - up to 2947, and by September 1 - up to 3107. To replenish the locomotive fleet of these roads from other highways and from the reserve 800 locomotives (496) were distilled. Of the 240 steam locomotives of the GKO reserve and 360 steam locomotives of the NKPS reserve, it was required to form 20 locomotive columns.

The GKO resolution provided for the creation of significant coal reserves by reserving reserves, as well as replenishing the railways of Siberia and the Far East with qualified personnel. During the second quarter of 1945, it was planned to increase the number of skilled workers by 30 thousand people, including machinists by 2373, assistant machinists by 2916, locomotive mechanics by 3155, conductors by 2074, track workers by 8816 people (497).

From April, units of three operational railway regiments and three operational departments from Poland and Romania began to enter the Special District of the Far East Railways; all special forces were returning from the southwestern highways. In total, there were over 14 thousand people (498) in these parts. At the disposal of the NKPS came 8,000 conscripts, recognized for health reasons as limited fit for military service. Two railway brigades and several special formations were sent for restoration work (499) . These works demanded enormous effort from the railroad workers.

The main military transportation, both centralized and interfrontal, was carried out by rail in May - July, but they were most intensive in June. By August 9, their total volume amounted to 222,331 wagons (in terms of two-axle), including 127,126 wagons arrived in the Far East from the central regions of the country. Of this number, 74,345 wagons were received for the Trans-Baikal Front. 1st Far East - 31,100, 2nd Far East - 17,916, and 81,538 wagons were used to deliver military units and formations (operational transportation) (500).

According to the types of troops, transportation was distributed as follows: 29.8 percent - for rifle troops, 30.5 percent - for artillery and armored vehicles, 39.7 percent - for aviation, engineering and other formations and units. The following facts testify to the intensity of the work of the railway: on average, in June - July, from 13 to 22 railway echelons arrived daily.

Significant intra- and inter-front transportation was carried out through internal railway, water and highway-unpaved communications. The transfer of troops along them was carried out in a combined way: by transport and on foot. May-August passed through railway tracks 95,205 wagons transported water transport about 700,000 tons of cargo, 513,000 tons on dirt roads and 4,222 tons transferred by air.

The main task of the railway units of the Trans-Baikal Front was the preparation of the main communications of the front - the single-track line Karymskaya - Borzya - Bayan-Tumen (Choibalsan). To do this, only in the weakest section of Borzya - Bayan-Tumen in June 1945, 13 sidings were built by the troops of the Trans-Baikal Front, the BOSO and railway workers. This made it possible to increase the capacity of the section from 7 to 18 pairs of trains per day (501) .

The 3rd railway brigade arrived at the disposal of the 1st Far Eastern Front from Czechoslovakia, which launched work on the Primorskaya Railway to develop stations, a water supply system and strengthen the upper structure of the track. In the 2nd Far Eastern Front, the 25th railway brigade increased the capacity of the Amur and Far Eastern railways from 25 to 30 pairs of trains per day by the start of hostilities. Since the arriving forces were not enough, about 80 different recovery trains and flyers were formed, serviced by brigades of railway workers on the Amur, Primorskaya and Far Eastern roads (502).

In total, in the spring and summer months of 1945, up to a million Soviet soldiers and officers (503), tens of thousands of artillery pieces, tanks, vehicles and many thousands of tons of ammunition, fuel, food, uniforms were on the communications routes of Siberia, Transbaikalia and the Far East and other cargo.

Throughout the entire length from Irkutsk to Vladivostok, the Trans-Siberian Railway was transferred to the operational group of the Logistics Directorate of the Soviet Army under the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East. The fronts, on the other hand, used branches from the main highway leading to the borders of Manchuria and Korea. Their total length was 2700 km. The Trans-Baikal Front had 12 railway sections (504) for basing, the 2nd Far East - 9 and the 1st Far East - 8. In addition, more than 800 km of narrow-gauge railways built before the war on the territory of the MPR were used.

Borzya station with a branch at Bayan-Tumen station (for the Trans-Baikal Front), Svobodny station with a branch in Khabarovsk (for the 2nd Far Eastern Front), Guberovo and Voroshilov stations (Ussuriysk) with a branch at Manzovka station ( for the 1st Far Eastern Front).

The greatest load was planned for the line in the Trans-Baikal Front. Meanwhile, the capacity of the railway sections Karymskaya - Borzya, Borzya - Bayan-Tumen could not provide the required speed of movement. In this regard, the front command decided to send motorized units and mechanized artillery from the Karymskaya station under its own power. To do this, special groups of officers arrived in Irkutsk and Karymskaya, who on the spot distributed units to follow on their own and along railway {505} .

In Primorye, troops were delivered by the Khabarovsk-Vladivostok railway, passing through separate sections 3 - 6 km from the state border. Therefore, the command of the 1st Far Eastern Front attached particular importance to the secrecy of transportation. Here, more often than on other fronts, in order to misinform the enemy, false transports of troops were carried out and false concentration areas were equipped.

A huge volume of transportation could not be carried out only by railroads: it was necessary to build and repair unpaved highways. As a result, by August 9, the length of only military highways in the Far East exceeded 4.2 thousand km, of which it reached 2279 km on the Trans-Baikal Front, 1509 km on the 1st Far East, and 485 km on the 2nd Far East ( 506) . This greatly increased the ability to maneuver manpower and military equipment at the beginning of hostilities.

In the prewar period, aviation in the Far East was not widely developed. During the war years, the length overhead lines increased from 12 thousand km in 1941 to 18 thousand km in 1945, that is, 1.5 times; from July 1, 1941 to May 31, 1945, over 66 thousand passengers, 7 thousand tons of cargo and about 2 thousand tons of mail were transported. During the period of hostilities, the crews of the Far Eastern Civil Aviation Administration made 439 sorties and transported more than 360 tons of defense cargo, as well as a significant number of passengers (507) .

In preparation for the war with Japan, a large proportion of traffic fell on the Far Eastern Shipping Company. The tasks of the fleet were determined by the GKO decree of April 30, 1945. The People's Commissariat of the Navy needed to ensure the transportation of 123 thousand tons of cargo in May through the Far Eastern water basin, including coal - 40.6 thousand tons, fish - 10.3 thousand tons, salt - 10.7 thousand tons from Sakhalin Island, imported cargo from Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky to Vladivostok - 18 thousand tons and various cargoes of Dalstroy - 17 thousand tons (508).

The implementation of measures to ensure the concentration and deployment of troops in the Far East allowed the Soviet command to proceed with a direct regrouping of troops. Although the State Defense Committee decided on a broad transfer of units only on June 3, 1945 (509), in fact, it began even before the end of the final campaign in Europe. In April, the reserve front department of the former Karelian Front arrived in the Far East, which was entrusted with the command of the Primorsky Group of Forces (510). Until May 9, two field-type fortified areas (511) were sent from the Stavka reserve. From May 9 to May 31, the field administration of the 5th Army arrived there, three directorates of rifle corps with four rifle divisions (512).

As a source of strategic deployment in the Far East, the Headquarters used the troops of four fronts that had completed combat operations on the Soviet-German front. The bulk of the regrouped troops were the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front: the directorate of the 5th and 39th combined arms armies, 6 directorates of rifle corps, 18 rifle and 2 anti-aircraft artillery divisions, 8 artillery and 2 rocket artillery brigades, or 60 percent of the total number formations of ground forces that arrived in the Far East. Front and 2 army directorates, 6 directorates of rifle, tank and mechanized corps, 10 rifle and anti-aircraft artillery divisions, 15 brigades of the main military branches were sent from the 2nd Ukrainian Front; from the Leningrad Front came the management of the breakthrough artillery corps and the mechanized corps, 6 divisions and 17 brigades of various branches of the ground forces.

The rest of the formations came from the 1st Belorussian Front (three rocket artillery brigades), the Moscow Military District (two tank brigades) and directly from the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (reserve front management, three brigades and two fortified areas) (513) . A large number of rear units and institutions arrived in the Far East from other military districts.

Such formations and formations were sent to the Far East that could successfully solve offensive tasks in the specific conditions of a theater of military operations. Determination of the expediency of using one or another connection depended on the experience and combat qualities accumulated in battles on the Soviet-German front. Thus, formations and units of the 5th and 39th armies, which participated in breaking through the fortified defensive zones in East Prussia, were intended to break through in the main directions of the border fortified areas. The first - in the offensive zone of the 1st Far Eastern Front, and the second - on the Trans-Baikal Front. Formations of the 6th Guards Tank and 53rd combined arms armies, which had extensive experience in operations in the mountain-steppe terrain, were included in the Trans-Baikal Front for an offensive in the wide desert expanses and mountainous wooded massifs of Manchuria.

The regrouping of such significant forces and means in a short time and over vast distances required its careful organization both on the part of higher authorities and directly at the places of deployment of troops.

Since the Japanese kept large forces on the border with the Soviet Union, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command took measures in advance to reliably cover the lines of communication, areas of concentration and deployment of troops from possible strikes (514) .

To ensure the secrecy of mass rail transportation, the admission of persons to their planning, control and accounting both in the General Staff and in the Central Directorate of Military Communications of the Soviet Army was limited; it was forbidden to conduct correspondence and negotiations related to the redeployment of troops, the stations for unloading and servicing echelons were numbered; the transmission of reports on the movement of echelons was strictly controlled by the VOSO officers. Military equipment on railway platforms was camouflaged (515) . The troops were unloaded, as a rule, at night, after which they were immediately withdrawn to the area of ​​concentration.

The deployment of strike groups was carried out so covertly that at the beginning of the Manchurian operation, complete surprise was achieved. The command of the Kwantung Army knew about the movements of Soviet troops that began in the spring, but they did not expect that the Soviet Union would complete this major regrouping of the Armed Forces so soon (516) .

Data on the number of forces and means of the ground forces that arrived in the Far East from May to August 8, 1945, are shown in Table 8.

The table shows that the strategic regrouping of troops reached its highest limit in July, when 51.1 percent of the ground forces, 52.2 percent of artillery and 58 percent of armored weapons arrived in the Far East from the ground forces.

In three months, the number of settlement divisions increased from 59.5 to 87.5, that is, 1.5 times, and the number of personnel of the entire group of troops - from 1,185,000 to 1,747,000 people.

Table 8. The number of ground forces regrouped from the west during the period of strategic deployment in the Far East (517)

Forces and means

Personnel

Rifles and carbines

Submachine guns

Machine guns and light machine guns

Guns and mortars

Tanks and self-propelled guns

Trucks

Tractors and tractors

horse composition

In total, during the period of strategic deployment, 2 front and 4 army directorates, 15 directorates of rifle, artillery, tank and mechanized corps, 36 rifle, artillery and anti-aircraft artillery divisions, 53 brigades of the main branches of the ground forces and 2 fortified areas were regrouped, which amounted to a total complexity of 30 settlement divisions. In addition, the management of the 6th bomber aviation corps and 5 aviation divisions arrived. The air defense of the Far East received 3 air defense corps of the country's territory. The average staffing of units and formations was about 80 percent (518). The troops that joined the Far Eastern group were armed with more than 600 rocket launchers, as well as 900 heavy, medium tanks and self-propelled guns.

The importance and expediency of the regrouping carried out to achieve victory in the war in the Far East in 1945 is evidenced by a well-known historical example. One of the reasons for the defeat of tsarist Russia in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. was the inability of the Russian command to transfer in a short time to the Far East the necessary human reserves, weapons, ammunition and other types of materiel.

The growth of combat forces and assets in the Far East, as well as the remoteness of this theater of operations, required the improvement of the strategic organs of the military leadership of the Far Eastern grouping of troops.

In order to coordinate the actions of the troops and the navy, as early as May 1945, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to create the High Command in the Far East, the Military Council and headquarters under it. At the end of June, a group of generals and officers headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky left for the Far East. This group launched work in Chita (519). By a decision of July 30, the Headquarters formalized the creation of a special body of higher command - the High Command of the Soviet Forces in the Far East, and by a directive of August 2 - the headquarters of the High Command of the Soviet Forces in the Far East, which actually operated from the beginning of July. Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky was appointed commander-in-chief, General I.V. Shikin was appointed a member of the Military Council, and General S.P. Ivanov (520) was appointed chief of staff. Coordination of the actions of the Pacific Fleet and the Red Banner Amur Flotilla with the troops was entrusted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces, Admiral of the Fleet N. G. Kuznetsov. The actions of aviation were led by the commander of the Air Force, Chief Marshal of Aviation A. A. Novikov.

Under the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East, an operational logistics group was created, headed by the Deputy Chief of the Logistics of the Soviet Army, General V. I. Vinogradov. It included a group of rear headquarters officers, representatives of the Central Directorate of Military Communications, the Main Automobile Directorate, the Main Road Directorate, the fuel supply, food and clothing supply departments, the Main Military Sanitary Directorate and the Main Trophy Directorate (521).

On August 5, 1945, the Supreme Command Headquarters renamed the Primorsky Group of Forces into the 1st Far Eastern Front, and the Far Eastern Front into the 2nd Far Eastern (522). At the same time, the coastal and Far Eastern directions (523) that existed as part of the operational department of the General Staff were also renamed.

By August 9, 1945, the Trans-Baikal, 1st and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts were deployed in the Far East, with the troops of which the 9th, 10th and 12th air armies, as well as the forces of the Pacific Fleet and the Red Banner Amur military flotilla, were to interact. Air defense was carried out by the Primorsky, Amur and Trans-Baikal air defense armies of the country's territory. Border Troops of Primorsky. For the first time in their history, the Khabarovsk and Trans-Baikal border districts were supposed to perform tasks unusual for them: participating in front-line operations, liquidate enemy border cordons and posts, destroy its fortified strongholds, and subsequently take Active participation in the pursuit of enemy troops and to protect communications, headquarters, important installations and rear areas.

The Transbaikal Front, commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky, a member of the Military Council, General A. N. Tevchenkov, chief of staff, General M. V. Zakharov, consisted of the 17th, 36th, 39th and 53rd combined arms (commander generals L I. Danilov, A. A. Luchinsky, I. I. Lyudnikov, I. M. Managarov), 6th Guards Tank (commanded by General A. G. Kravchenko), 12th Air (commanded by General S. A. Khudyakov) of the armies and the horse-mechanized group of the Soviet-Mongolian troops (commander General I. A. Pliev, his deputy for the Mongolian troops, General Zh. Lkhagvasuren). The anti-aircraft cover of the troops of the front was carried out by army and divisional anti-aircraft artillery, as well as the Trans-Baikal Air Defense Army of the country's territory (commander General P. F. Rozhkov).

By the beginning of hostilities, the troops of the Trans-Baikal Front consisted of 13 directorates of rifle, artillery, tank and mechanized corps, 39 divisions and 45 brigades (rifle, airborne, cavalry, artillery, mortar, rocket artillery, tank, mechanized, anti-aircraft and self-propelled artillery), 2 fortified areas and 54 separate regiments of the main branches of the ground forces, 2 directorates of bomber aviation corps, 6 bomber divisions, 2 assault, 3 fighter, 2 transport and 7 separate aviation regiments.

Horse-mechanized formations and units of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army consisted of 4 cavalry and aviation divisions, a motorized armored brigade, tank, artillery regiments and a communications regiment with a total strength of about 16 thousand people, 128 guns and mortars and 32 light tanks (524).

In the Trans-Baikal Air Defense Army of the country there were 3 air defense divisions, 2 separate anti-aircraft artillery air defense regiments of railway echelons and a fighter aviation division. In total, the Trans-Baikal grouping of troops consisted of 648 thousand people, or 37.1 percent of the number of Soviet troops in the Far East. It was armed with 9668 guns and mortars, 2359 tanks and self-propelled guns, 369 rocket launchers and 1324 combat aircraft (525). The total length of the Trans-Baikal Front along the state border was 2300 km (526).

The 1st Far Eastern Front, commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union K. A. Meretskov, member of the Military Council General T. F. Shtykov, chief of staff General A. N. Krutikov, included the 1st Red Banner, 5th, 25th and 35th combined-arms armies (commanded by Generals A.P. Beloborodov, N.I. Krylov, I.M. Chistyakov, N.D. Zakhvataev), the Chuguev task force (commanded by General V.A. Zaitsev), the 10th mechanized corps (commander General I. D. Vasiliev) and the 9th Air Army (commanded by General I. M. Sokolov). The troops of the Primorsky Air Defense Army of the country's territory were stationed on the territory of the front (commander General A.V. Gerasimov).

By August 9, the front command had control of 10 rifle and mechanized corps, 34 divisions, 47 brigades and 34 separate regiments of the main branches of the ground forces, 14 fortified areas, a bomber aviation corps, 3 bomber, 3 fighter, 2 assault air divisions and 6 separate aviation regiments. The coastal air defense army of the country's territory included the directorate of the air defense corps, 2 air defense divisions, an anti-aircraft artillery division, and an anti-aircraft artillery brigade. 2 anti-aircraft artillery regiments and a fighter aviation division. In total, the coastal grouping had about 589 thousand people (33.7 percent), 11,430 guns and mortars, 274 rocket launchers, 1,974 slippers and self-propelled guns, and 1,137 combat aircraft (527). The length of the 1st Far Eastern Front was 700 km (528).

The 2nd Far Eastern Front, commanded by General M.A. Purkaev, a member of the Military Council, General D.S. Leonov, the chief of staff, General F.I. Shevchenko, included the 2nd Red Banner, 15th and 16th combined arms ( Commanding Generals M. F. Terekhin, S. K. Mamonov, L. G. Cheremisov) and the 10th Air Army (commander General P. F. Zhigarev), the 5th Separate Rifle Corps (commander General I. Z. Pashkov ). The Amur Air Defense Army of the country's territory (commanded by General Ya. K. Polyakov) was also located within the front. The front included the directorates of 2 rifle corps, 12 rifle and anti-aircraft artillery divisions, 4 rifle, 9 tank and 2 anti-tank brigades, 5 fortified areas, 34 separate regiments of the main branches of the ground forces, the command of the mixed aviation corps, bomber, 2 assault , 3 fighter and 2 mixed aviation divisions, 9 separate aviation regiments. The Amur Air Defense Army of the country's territory consisted of directorates of 2 air defense corps, 2 air defense divisions, 2 anti-aircraft artillery brigades, 2 separate anti-aircraft artillery regiments and a fighter aviation division. This grouping included 333,000 people (19.1 percent), 5,988 guns and mortars, 72 rocket launchers, 917 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 1,260 combat aircraft. The length of the 2nd Far Eastern Front reached 2130 km (529).

The Pacific Fleet, commanded by Admiral I. S. Yumashev, a member of the Military Council, General S. E. Zakharov, and the chief of staff, Vice Admiral A. S. Frolov, had 2 cruisers, a leader, 12 destroyers, 19 patrol ships, 78 submarines, 52 minesweepers, 49 submarine chasers, 204 torpedo boats (530). The aviation of the fleet consisted of 1618 aircraft, of which 1382 were combat. The number of personnel is about 165 thousand people, the fleet had 2550 guns and mortars, as well as other weapons (531). The Pacific Fleet was based at Vladivostok, as well as Sovetskaya Gavan and Petropavlovsk.

The Red Banner Amur Flotilla, commanded by Rear Admiral N.V. Antonov, a member of the Military Council Rear Admiral M.G. Yakovenko, the chief of staff, Captain 1st Rank A.M. Gushchin, had in service 8 monitors, 11 gunboats, 7 mine boats, 52 armored boats, 12 minesweepers, 36 minesweepers and a number of auxiliary ships(532) . Its aviation consisted of 68 combat aircraft. In addition, all patrol boats of the border guard on the Amur and Ussuri, as well as ships of the civil river shipping company, were subordinate to the commander of the flotilla. The flotilla included 12.5 thousand people, 199 anti-aircraft guns and mortars (533). The Red Banner Amur military flotilla was based at Khabarovsk, Malaya Sazanka on the Zeya River, Sretensk on the Shilka River and Lake Khanka.

So, by August 9, 1945, 11 combined arms, tank and 3 air armies, 3 air defense armies of the country's territory, a fleet and a flotilla were deployed against the Japanese armed forces in the Far East. They included directorates of 33 corps, 131 divisions and 117 brigades of the main branches of service. The land border of the USSR was covered by 21 fortified areas. The total strength of the Soviet Far Eastern group and its weapons are shown in Table 9.

Table 9. The number of personnel, weapons and military equipment of the Soviet group of forces in the Far East at the beginning of the war against Japan (534)

Forces and means

Ground troops

Air defense forces of the country

Personnel

Rifles and carbines

Submachine guns

Machine guns and light machine guns

Guns and mortars

Tanks and self-propelled guns

combat aircraft

Warships of the main classes

The grouping of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East was a force capable of crushing Japanese troops in Manchuria in a short time. It was based on soldiers and officers of formations and units who were in the Far East during the war, but were well trained in the course of lengthy combat training and knew the theater of operations, the nature of the enemy’s defense and the features Japanese army. The personnel of the armies transferred from the west had extensive experience in operating against a strong enemy. The skillful use of these features significantly increased the striking power of the grouping and in many respects predetermined the success of the entire campaign.

Residents of the Far East are seriously concerned about the activity of the military in the region. People report about the pulling of forces to the borders with the DPRK. The situation is being escalated in social networks and instant messengers, where it is already reported that the inhabitants of Primorye have begun to actively leave the region.

« The situation is tense. Military equipment arrives in Vladivostok, trains are unloaded on the second river - military units are quartered there. There will be a mess, it will not seem enough to everyone». « Everyone goes to the airport. People are leaving in families. Taxis can't take everyone out. Many people from Seoul fly to Vladivostok, Russians from Korea return", - the seasiders report.

Earlier, a number of Western media reported on the dispatch of additional forces and equipment to the borders of the Russian Federation in the Far East. Publications suggest that Moscow is reinforcing the borders in order to contain the flow of refugees, which could rush in the event of a US missile attack on the DPRK.

According to media reports, the combat reinforcement is not only Russia. China's air force has been put on high alert, CNN reported. According to the channel's sources, China may be preparing to respond to the extraordinary circumstances associated with Korea.

A video has also appeared on the network, which shows the massive movement of military equipment by rail, presumably to Vladivostok.

« For today alone, this is the third train with military equipment. It looks like something is pecking on the border with Korea", - comments the author of the video.

On the video, you can identify the Tor anti-aircraft missile systems designed for air and missile defense.

The press secretary of the President of the Russian Federation commented on the incident Dmitry Peskov, noting that the issues of deployment of troops within the country are not public.

« Issues of deployment of troops within the country are not classified as public", Peskov said.

The military was quick to announce that a routine check of combat readiness was underway.

« As part of it, formations rise in alarm and make forced marches, including to unfamiliar training grounds", - said the head of the press service of the Eastern Military District (VVO) Alexander Gordeev.

As reported website, a number of media voices the version that the Americans can hit North Korea's nuclear facilities in order to prevent nuclear tests. To date, a combat squadron with the US Navy nuclear attack aircraft carrier Carl Vinson has been transferred to the shores of the DPRK, in addition, the Stethem missile destroyer has been sent to the South Korean Sea.

The conflict between the US and the DPRK may go into a military phase. This was stated on Sputnil radio by a political scientist, deputy director of the Institute of History and Politics of the Moscow Pedagogical State University. Vladimir Shapovalov, commenting on the statement of the Vice President of the United States Michael Pence that peace is achieved by force. Pence also urged Pyongyang not to be decisive Donald Trump.

« All statements and threats against the DPRK, of course, should be understood as the desire of the United States to exert military and political pressure on China and thereby, in fact, “return” to the Far East. In fact, the United States has significantly weakened its position in the Far East in recent decades - both military and, more importantly, economic. This happened simultaneously with the strengthening of China's positions there. And the current military demonstration by the United States is designed to restore and strengthen their position.", - Vladimir Shapovalov is sure.


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The article describes the causes of the Soviet-Japanese armed conflict, the preparation of the parties for war, the course of hostilities. The characteristic of international relations before the beginning of the Second World War in the east is given.

Introduction

Active hostilities in the Far East and in the Pacific Ocean were the result of the contradictions that had arisen in the pre-war years between the USSR, Great Britain, the USA and China, on the one hand, and Japan, on the other. The Japanese government sought to seize new territories rich in natural resources and establish political hegemony in the Far East.

Since the end of the 19th century, Japan has waged many wars, as a result of which it acquired new colonies. It included the Kuril Islands, southern Sakhalin, Korea, Manchuria. In 1927, General Giichi Tanaka became the Prime Minister of the country, whose government continued aggressive policy. In the early 1930s, Japan increased the size of its army and created a powerful Navy, which was one of the strongest in the world.

In 1940, Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe developed a new foreign policy doctrine. The Japanese government planned to create a colossal empire stretching from Transbaikalia to Australia. Western countries pursued a dual policy towards Japan: on the one hand, they sought to limit the ambitions of the Japanese government, but on the other hand, they did not interfere with the intervention of northern China. To implement its plans, the Japanese government entered into an alliance with Germany and Italy.

Relations between Japan and the Soviet Union deteriorated markedly in the prewar period. In 1935, the Kwantung Army entered the border regions of Mongolia. Mongolia hastily concluded an agreement with the USSR, units of the Red Army were introduced into its territory. In 1938, Japanese troops crossed the state border of the USSR in the region of Lake Khasan, but the invasion attempt was successfully repelled by Soviet troops. Japanese sabotage groups were also repeatedly thrown into Soviet territory. The confrontation escalated even more in 1939, when Japan launched a war against Mongolia. The USSR, observing the agreement with the Mongolian Republic, intervened in the conflict.

After these events, Japan's policy towards the USSR changed: the Japanese government was afraid of a collision with a strong western neighbor and decided to temporarily abandon the seizure of territories in the north. Nevertheless, for Japan, the USSR was actually the main enemy in the Far East.

Non-aggression pact with Japan

In the spring of 1941, the USSR signed a non-aggression pact with Japan. In the event of an armed conflict of one of the states with any third countries, the second power undertook to remain neutral. But the Japanese Foreign Minister made it clear to the German ambassador in Moscow that the concluded neutrality pact would not prevent Japan from fulfilling the conditions Tripartite Pact during the war with the USSR.

Before the outbreak of World War II in the east, Japan was negotiating with American leaders seeking recognition of the annexation of Chinese territories and the conclusion of new trade treaties. The ruling elite of Japan could not decide against whom to direct the blow in a future war. Some politicians considered it necessary to support Germany, while another part called for an attack on the Pacific colonies of Great Britain and the United States.

As early as 1941, it became obvious that Japan's actions would depend on the situation on the Soviet-German front. The Japanese government planned to attack the USSR from the east if Germany and Italy succeeded, after the capture German troops Moscow. Also of great importance was the fact that the country needed raw materials for its industry. The Japanese were interested in capturing areas rich in oil, tin, zinc, nickel and rubber. Therefore, on July 2, 1941, at the imperial conference, it was decided to start a war against the USA and Great Britain. But The Japanese government did not completely abandon plans to attack the USSR until the Battle of Kursk, when it became obvious that Germany would not win the Second World War. Along with this factor, the active military operations of the allies in the Pacific forced Japan to repeatedly postpone and then completely abandon its aggressive intentions against the USSR.

The situation in the Far East during the Second World War

Despite the fact that hostilities in the Far East never began, the USSR was forced to maintain a large military grouping in this region throughout the war, the size of which varied in different periods. Until 1945, the Kwantung Army was located on the border, which included up to 1 million servicemen. The local population also prepared for defense: men were mobilized into the army, women and teenagers studied air defense methods. Fortifications were built around strategically important objects.

The Japanese leadership believed that the Germans would be able to capture Moscow before the end of 1941. In this regard, it was planned to launch an offensive against the Soviet Union in the winter. On December 3, the Japanese command ordered the troops in China to prepare for the transfer to the north. The Japanese were going to invade the USSR in the Ussuri region, and then launch an offensive in the north. To implement the approved plan, it was necessary to strengthen the Kwantung Army. Troops liberated after the fighting in the Pacific were sent to the Northern Front.

However, the hopes of the Japanese government for a quick German victory did not come true. The failure of the blitzkrieg tactics and the defeat of the Wehrmacht armies near Moscow testified that the Soviet Union was a strong enough adversary whose power should not be underestimated.

The threat of a Japanese invasion intensified in the fall of 1942. Troops Nazi Germany attacked the Caucasus and the Volga. The Soviet command hastily transferred 14 rifle divisions and more than 1,500 guns from the Far East to the front. Just at this time, Japan did not conduct active battles in the Pacific. However, the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief foresaw the possibility of a Japanese attack. The Far Eastern troops received replenishment from local reserves. This fact became known to Japanese intelligence. The Japanese government again delayed entry into the war.

The Japanese attacked merchant ships in neutral waters, preventing the delivery of goods to the Far Eastern ports, and repeatedly violated state borders, committed sabotage on Soviet territory, threw propaganda literature across the border. Japanese intelligence collected information about the movements of the Soviet troops and transmitted them to the headquarters of the Wehrmacht. Among the reasons for the USSR's entry into the Japanese War in 1945 were not only obligations to the allies, but also concern for the security of its borders.

Already in the second half of 1943, when the turning point in the course of World War II ended, it became clear that, following Italy, which had already withdrawn from the war, Germany and Japan would also be defeated. The Soviet command, foreseeing a future war in the Far East, from that time almost did not use the Far Eastern troops on the Western Front. Gradually, these units of the Red Army were replenished with military equipment and manpower. In August 1943, the Primorsky Group of Forces was created as part of the Far Eastern Front, which indicated preparations for a future war.

On the Yalta Conference, held in February 1945, the Soviet Union confirmed that the agreement between Moscow and the allies on participation in the war with Japan remains in force. The Red Army was to begin military operations against Japan no later than 3 months after the end of the war in Europe. In return, I. V. Stalin demanded territorial concessions for the USSR: the transfer of the Kuril Islands to Russia and the part of Sakhalin Island assigned to Japan as a result of the war of 1905, the transfer of the Chinese port of Port Arthur (on modern maps - Luishun ). The Dalniy commercial port was to become an open port, with the interests of the USSR being predominantly observed.

By this time, the US and British Armed Forces had inflicted a number of defeats on Japan. However, her resistance was not broken. The US, Chinese and British demand for unconditional surrender on 26 July was rejected by Japan. This decision was not unfounded. The United States and Great Britain did not have sufficient forces to carry out landing operation in the Far East. According to the plans of the American and British leaders, the final defeat of Japan was envisaged no earlier than 1946. The Soviet Union, having entered the war with Japan, significantly brought the end of World War II closer.

Forces and plans of the parties

The Soviet-Japanese war or the Manchurian operation began on August 9, 1945. The Red Army was faced with the task of defeating the Japanese troops in China and North Korea.

Back in May 1945, the USSR began the transfer of troops to the Far East. 3 fronts were formed: the 1st and 2nd Far Eastern and Transbaikal. The Soviet Union used border troops, the Amur military flotilla and ships of the Pacific Fleet in the offensive.

The Kwantung Army included 11 infantry and 2 tank brigades, more than 30 infantry divisions, cavalry and mechanized units, a suicide brigade, and the Sungari River Flotilla. The most significant forces were deployed in the eastern regions of Manchuria, bordering on the Soviet Primorye. In the western regions, the Japanese deployed 6 infantry divisions and 1 brigade. The number of enemy soldiers exceeded 1 million people, but more than half of the fighters were recruits of younger ages and limited fit. Many Japanese units were understaffed. Also, the newly created units lacked weapons, ammunition, artillery and other military equipment. Outdated tanks and aircraft were used in Japanese units and formations.

On the side of Japan, the troops of Manchukuo, the army of Inner Mongolia and the Suiyuan army group fought. In the border areas, the enemy built 17 fortified areas. The command of the Kwantung Army was carried out by General Otsuzo Yamada.

The plan of the Soviet command provided for two main strikes by the forces of the 1st Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal fronts, as a result of which the main enemy forces in the center of Manchuria would be pincered, divided into parts and defeated. The troops of the 2nd Far Eastern Front, consisting of 11 rifle divisions, 4 rifle and 9 tank brigades, in cooperation with the Amur military flotilla, were supposed to strike in the direction of Harbin. Then the Red Army was to occupy large settlements - Shenyang, Harbin, Changchun. The fighting took place on a stretch of more than 2.5 thousand km. on the map of the area.

Start of hostilities

Simultaneously with the beginning of the offensive of the Soviet troops, aviation carried out bombing of areas of large concentrations of troops, strategically significant objects and communication centers. Pacific Fleet ships attacked Japanese naval bases in North Korea. The offensive was led by the commander-in-chief of the Soviet troops in the Far East, A. M. Vasilevsky.

As a result of the military operations of the troops of the Trans-Baikal Front, which, having crossed the Gobi Desert and the Khingan Mountains on the first day of the offensive, advanced 50 km, significant groups of enemy troops were defeated. The offensive was hampered by the natural conditions of the area. There was not enough fuel for the tanks, but the units of the Red Army used the experience of the Germans - the supply of fuel by transport aircraft was organized. On August 17, the 6th Guards Tank Army reached the approaches to the capital of Manchuria. Soviet troops isolated the Kwantung Army from the Japanese units in Northern China and occupied important administrative centers.

The Soviet group of troops advancing from Primorye broke through the border fortifications. In the Mudanjiang area, the Japanese launched a series of counterattacks, which were repulsed. Soviet units occupied Kirin and Harbin, and, with the assistance of the Pacific Fleet, liberated the coast, capturing strategically important ports.

Then the Red Army liberated North Korea, and from mid-August, hostilities took place in China. On August 14, the Japanese command initiated surrender negotiations. On August 19, enemy troops began to surrender en masse. However, the hostilities of World War II continued until early September.

Simultaneously with the defeat of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, Soviet troops carried out the South Sakhalin offensive operation and landed troops on the Kuril Islands. During the operation in the Kuriles on August 18-23, Soviet troops, with the support of the ships of the Peter and Paul Naval Base, captured Samusya Island and occupied all the islands of the Kuril chain by September 1.

Results

As a result of the defeat of the Kwantung Army on the continent, Japan could no longer continue the war. The enemy lost important economic regions in Manchuria and Korea. The Americans carried out atomic bombings of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and captured the island of Okinawa. On September 2, an act of surrender was signed.

The USSR included the territories lost Russian Empire at the beginning of the twentieth century: South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. In 1956, the USSR restored relations with Japan and agreed to the transfer of the Habomai Islands and the Shikotan Islands to Japan, subject to the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between the countries. But Japan has not come to terms with territorial losses and negotiations on the ownership of the disputed regions still do not stop.

For military merit, more than 200 units received the titles of Amur, Ussuri, Khingan, Harbin, etc. 92 servicemen became Heroes of the Soviet Union.

As a result of the operation, the losses of the warring countries amounted to:

  • from the USSR - about 36.5 thousand military personnel,
  • from Japan - more than 1 million soldiers and officers.

Also, during the fighting, all the ships of the Sungaria flotilla were sunk - more than 50 ships.

Medal "For the victory over Japan"

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